This paper examines how political ideology influenced economic freedom in the Canadian provinces. 
Introduction
Government ideology influenced economic policies in the Canadian provinces. Empirical studies suggest that, for example, leftwing governments pursued more expansionary fiscal policies by increasing public expenditures while public revenues appear to be less driven by government ideology.
The fact that studies identify ideological effects in fiscal policy is meaningful because the Canadian constitutions and federal politics leave provincial governments with significant room to maneuver.
2 In a similar vein, labor market regulations and legislation are also primarily the abode of provincial governments instead of being governed from the federal level. Yet, the influence of government ideology on labor market regulation and economic liberalization in general has been largely ignored in the political economy literature. Against the background of the sustained interest in the role of political ideology in Canadian economic policy, this is a surprising omission, not least since the few crosscountry studies exploring government intervention and liberalization tend to find evidence of partisan effects (Imbeau et al. 2001 ).
The ideological structure of provincial parliaments and the variations across different factions and parties plays a significant role in Canadian politics. However, contrary to US politics the Canadian political system is most often characterized as closely fitting a brokerage model. Only considering the ideology of the party in government, as previous studies have done, does not provide a comprehensive picture of political ideology and economic policies in the Canadian provinces. Neither does a static characterization of party positions, as political parties tend to shift positions on a left-to-right scale over time. Political economy studies on partisan politics in the Canadian provinces may hence benefit from addressing parliamentary cohesion and party changes.
In this paper, we consequently examine how political ideology has influenced economic freedom in the Canadian provinces, taking these challenges into consideration. We analyze the dataset of economic freedom indicators compiled by the Fraser Institute in ten Canadian provinces over the period and introduce two different indices of political ideology: government and parliament ideology. We allow for parties to drift on the left-to-right scale, taking party changes into account. The results suggest that government ideology influenced labor market reforms: market-oriented governments promoted liberalization of the labor market but parliamentary ideology did not influence economic liberalization at all. At a more disaggregated level, we find that the ideological effects on the labor market are due to more leftwing governments increasing public employment. These findings (1) identify differences between leftist and rightwing governments concerning the role of government in the economy and (2) indicate that ideological polarization concerns governments but less so parliamentary fractions in the Canadian provinces.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature on partisan politics in Canadian provinces and formulates the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents our indices on political ideology in the Canadian provinces. Section 4 presents the data on economic freedom and specifies the empirical model. Section 5 reports and discusses the estimation results, and investigates their robustness. Section 6 concludes.
Partisan politics in Canadian provinces
Partisan politics has been a heavily debated topic in empirical political economy. Scholars have extensively examined to what extent and in which areas government ideology influenced economic policy (e.g. Hibbs 1977 , 1992 , Alesina et al. 1997 , Imbeau et al. 2001 , Bjørnskov 2008 . While most studies are conducted at either a cross-country level or as comparisons between US states (e.g., the companion paper by Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2009 ), a small literature deals explicitly with Canada.
In the Canadian provinces, government ideology has played an important role in fiscal policy.
Consistent with standard partisan theory, leftwing governments pursued a more expansionary fiscal policy than rightwing governments. In particular, leftwing governments increased public expenditures (see, for example, Tellier 2006 , Pétry et al. 1999 ) and government ideology influenced the budget composition (Kneebone and McKenzie 2001, Blais and Nadeau 1992) . 3 The empirical studies also suggest that electoral motives manipulated fiscal policies in the Canadian provinces (see also Reid 1998 , Imbeau and Tellier 2004 , Tellier 2004 . At the federal level, electoral motives influenced public expenditures, while ideology-induced effects were less significant in the 1954-1992 period (Pétry and Harmatz 1995) . In the long run, however, neither partisan nor electoral cycles influenced public expenditures in Canada (Ferris et al. 2008 ).
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At a more disaggregated level, spending on public health in the Canadian provinces appears to be driven by government ideology. The results by di Matteo (2009) , for example, suggest that center-left parties are associated with smaller public shares for spending on health professionals and larger shares for total health spending. 5 Ideology-induced responses to globalization tended to depend on the level of unionization: when unionization was high and globalization was proceeding rapidly, leftwing governments have reduced public spending in the Canadian provinces (Pickup 2006) . When unionization was low and globalization was proceeding rapidly, leftist governments have implemented compensatory spending.
Conversely, party affiliation and government ideology do not appear to have an influence on (air) pollution in Canada. The empirical results by McKitrick (2006) suggest that government's political stripe in 13 Canadian cities has not reliably been associated with positive or negative effects on air 3 Political ideology also influenced fiscal policies in the US states. See, for example, Berry et al. (1999) . 4 In general, electoral and partisan cycles did not influence macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and unemployment in
Canada (Serletis and Afxentiou 1998) . 5 On the effects of government subsidies to employer-provided health insurance in the Canadian provinces see, for example, Stabile (2001) .
pollution. McKitrick (2006: 616) comes to the conclusion that "on air quality all the leading political parties seem to favour slow, incremental improvements, with only small differences among parties in the desired rates of change."
The implementation of abortion policy -a strongly value-ladden question in North Americahas not only appeared to be a controversial issue between leftist and rightwing parties in Canada but also between the federal government and the provinces. For example, the Liberal Party which was in power on the federal level in 1995 opted for abortion services as medically necessary service. The governments in the provinces, however, such as the conservative one in Alberta as well as the leftwing government in the prairie province Saskatchewan were opposed to more abortion services (for an encompassing discussion of Canadian abortion policy from a political economic perspective see, for example, Palley 2006) . In some areas, parties evidently acted differently on their 'home turf' than at the federal level.
There is thus plenty of evidence for partisan ideological effects in Canada, although the evidence is not uncontested and varies across different purposes. Only few studies, however, take into account that the political system and political traditions in Canada are somewhat different from those of other federal nations, and in particular the US. 6 Virtually all studies consider the political ideology of the incumbent government, yet much of the complementary literature on party systems and political institutions has characterized Canada as a country in which politics mostly resembles the brokerage model (e.g. Stevenson 1987, Young and . Canadian party positions are known to be ideologically somewhat opaque. Malloy (2003: 121) , for example, assesses that "party platforms are generally vague and it is typical following elections for governments to embark on major new policies not mentioned in the general election and with little consultation of parliamentary caucuses". In addition, the ideological cohesion of Canadian parties seems relatively weak, as parties more function as 'brokers' between many different factions and individual views represented in the party. As already weakly cohesive parties try to attract voters, their ideological position becomes less certain, with the possible exception of the new parties in a system that used to be a 'two-party plus' game (Stephenson and Bélanger 2007) . What is the result of a perfect brokerage model is therefore a political game, which tends to resemble purely Downsian voting where official parties' ideology would be little more than cheap talk (Downs 1957 (Poole and Rosenthal 2001) . As such, simply defining a 'standard' position of a party is sufficient to capture most of the structure of actual voting in the Canadian parliaments.
Second, a perfect brokerage model instead means that the ideology of the governing party/parties only exerts an influence on policy choices through their relative bargaining power. If, as is the case in brokerage politics, parties agree across parliamentary divides what to do, outcomes would presumably be determined by the bargaining power of each single political position. In addition, bargains across political divides would presumably be easier given the intra-party diversity of ideological positions that necessarily follows from weak ideological cohesion, which would tend to create inter-party ideological overlaps. In a Canadian and similar contexts, this means that ideological effects on political outcomes would follow not from the ideological position of the incumbent government but the average ideological position of the provincial parliament. Hence, even though we expect, on the basis of the existing literature, to find evidence of partisan political effects across the Canadian provinces, we a priori cannot hypothesize about which field of politics -the governing party or the entire party system -is relevant.
Following the implications of the related literature on partisan politics in the Canadian provinces and government ideology and economic liberalization the two competing hypotheses to be investigated in the following are:
1. Market-oriented governments have been more active in economic liberalization in Canadian provinces than leftwing governments.
2. Government ideology does not matter for policy-making in Canada, but the relative bargaining power of ideological positions does, given that Canadian politics are characterized by the brokerage model.
To test these hypotheses, we first need a measure of government and parliamentary ideology consistent across time and provinces.
An ideology index for Canadian provinces
Since Castles and Mair's (1984) pioneering efforts, many attempts have been made at coding ideology consistently across countries and periods (e.g. Huber and Inglehart 1995 , Mair and Castles 1997 , Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 1998 , 2000 , Bjørnskov 2008 , Potrafke 2009a ). The literature reflects three overarching problems when placing parties on a left-right scale: 1) the potential multidimensionality of political positions; 2) the comparability of scales across countries; and 3) the stability of scales across time. In the following, we base our argument on the premise that by exploring the potentially ideological political behavior across Canada, we address the specific problems associated with whether ideology-induced effects are driven by the position of the government or the ideological make-up of the provincial parliament.
Common to all ideology indices is a fourth underlying problem, the question what ideology is.
Ideology is difficult to define and conceptualize but most people recognize it when they see it. When treating ideology with a modicum of scientific precision, a definition is necessary (cf. Gerring 1997).
Most recent studies follow Gerring's (1997) approach, concluding his survey of the post-WWII literature by stressing the need for internal coherence in any core definition of ideology. He tries to differentiate ideology from, e.g., culture or belief-systems by arguing that a set of values "becomes ideological only insofar as it specifies a concrete program, a set of issue-positions" (Gerring 1997: 975) .
Any measure of political ideology thus has to rest on a coherent and consistent program, associating issue-positions with preferred outcomes or actions, although this program may only be implicit.
Our political ideology coding does not suffer from comparability problems across objects as we only deal with the Canadian party system and do not make any cross-country comparisons. The analysis therefore takes place within the same institutional and political setup and broadly similar political tradition. Second, the coding explicitly addresses the first problem by focusing only on economic issues, which takes up an important part of Canadian politics (Kam, 2001; Cross and Young, 2002; Blais et al., 2004) . Third, as we outline below, we consider a specific source of movements in the political scale to address the potential problem of temporal comparisons.
We eventually employ the index illustrated in Figure 1 , which allows the three major parties to take up more than a singular point on the left-to-right line. For example, we distinguish between the social democrat part of the New Democratic Party, which we ordinarily place at -2/3, and its more outright socialist faction placed at -1. Likewise, we distinguish between the social liberal faction of the Liberal party, placed at -1/3, and the business liberal faction, which we place at 0 and consider the 'standard position' of the party. Finally, the Progressive Conservative Party is spread between Red
Tories at 1/3, the 'standard' position of the party at 2/3, and a clear right wing at 1, which would be comparable to the Republican Party in the US during the Reagan years.
This implies that, accepting our coding, we are also able to distinguish between provincial governments lead by different factions of each party. While this coding clearly has an inevitable subjective element, it retains what is a standard ranking of Canadian parties and replicates the increasing political span of Canadian politics (e.g. Huber and Inglehart 1995, Mair and Castles 1997) . The results in Cross and Young (2002) reconfirm this ranking
by showing that members of the five parties place themselves accordingly on most issues, and in particular clearly so on economic issues. We therefore believe that although the validity of the implicit assumptions of unidimensionality and equidistance may be uncertain, as is the case of all ideology indices, our coding captures entirely standard features of the basic structure of the Canadian political system. Our possibility to assign provincial governments to factions within parties allows us to some extent to take party changes into account. This additional flexibility solves at least some of the problem in the literature associated with shifting party positions and accompanying scale instability of ideology indices (Knight 2006 , Berry et al. 2007 , Potrafke 2008 ).
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To illustrate the structure of our index, Figure 2 shows the average ideology of the provincial parliaments across the 1981-2005 period, measured as either the average ideology of votes, seats or governments. Interestingly, the figure not only depicts the substantial differences across the ten provinces, but also the discrepancy between the average ideology of voters and that of the resulting parliaments and governments. This discrepancy, which is partially a result of the Westminster style, first-past-the-post institution of Canadian democracy, means that the distribution of seats is somewhat more variable than that of votes, and the distribution of governments even more so; we therefore employ the distribution of seats instead of votes to calculate the average parliamentary position. Yet, the data also emphasize the substantial difference in what may be termed ideological 'traditions' across the ten provinces with Québéc substantially more leftwing than other provinces and Alberta the most conservative province.
While Figure 2 shows the long-run spatial ideological differences across Canada, Figure 3 illustrates the development of average ideology over time across the ten provinces since 1981. Again, Figure 3 illustrates how a first-past-the-post system tends to scale up the parliamentary consequences of ideological movements among voters and the massive loss of voters suffered by the Progressive Conservative Party after its heyday when it colloquially was referred to as 'The Big Blue Machine'.
While average ideology had trended slightly to the left since 1981, the almost violent demise of the Tories came about after a series of scandals of high-level corruption and nepotism (e.g. Kaplan 2000) .
From the late 1990s onwards, the conservative party has regained its status as several provincial parties distanced themselves from the federal Progressive Conservative Party and also moved away from Red Tory positions to more clearly ideological platforms.
Averaging economic freedom (as defined below) across the ten provinces reveals an ideological pattern, as the correlation over time between overall economic freedom and the average ideology of the provincial parliaments is .39, using our ideology index based on the distribution of seats, .37 using the ideology index based on the distribution of votes, and .71 using the average ideology of governments.
In the following, we explore this association in substantially more detail across both time and provinces during the 1981-2005 period.
Data and estimation strategy 4.1 Data on economic freedom in the Canadian Provinces
We use the dataset on economic freedom in the Canadian provinces first introduced by Karabegovic et al. (2003) . This dataset, which is available for the 1981-2005 period, contains yearly data for the ten Canadian provinces: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan (balanced panel).
The index of economic freedom includes three components: 1) the size of government, capturing general government consumption expenditure (percent of GDP), transfers and subsidies (percent of GDP), and social security payments (percent of GDP); 2) the tax structure, measured as an index equally weighing tax revenue (percent of GDP), the top marginal tax rate and its applied income threshold, indirect tax revenue (percent of GDP) and sales taxes (percent of GDP); and 3) labor market freedom, measured as the extent of minimum wage legislation, government employment (percent of total provincial employment) and union density. The overall indicators take on values between 0 (minimum of economic freedom) and 10 (maximum of economic freedom). When we in the following split one of the three components into its constituent parts, we use the original, non-indexed data. provinces such as New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. We will use these four indicators on "Overall economic freedom", "Size of government", "Takings and discriminatory taxation" and "Labor market freedom" as dependent variables in the econometric model.
Empirical model
The basic panel data model has the following form:
∆ln Economic Freedom Index ijt = α Ideology it + Σ k β k ∆ln X ikt + β l Z ilt + η i + ε t + u ijt with i=1,…,10; j = 1,…, 4; k=1,…,3; l=1,…,2; t=1,...,24
where the dependent variable ∆ln Economic Freedom Index ijt denotes the growth rate of economic freedom index j. We distinguish between the four indicators of "Overall economic freedom", "Size of Table 1 illustrates the regression results when the government ideology index is used and reports the coefficients and t-statistics (in absolute terms) for every single equation. The two economic control variables -five-year average of the unemployment rate and the external trade variable -mostly turn out to be statistically significant although the latter has a positive influence on labor market freedom (column 4) which is statistically significant at the 1% level. An F-test of the joint inclusion of the fixed period effects is strongly significant, which indicates time dependence of the dependent variables, i.e., a joint national trend. On the other hand, economic liberalization did not depend on political competition as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index does not turn out to be statistically significant across all equations.
Results

Basic Results
The main results in Table 1 show that government ideology did not influence overall economic liberalization (column 1), the sub-indicators on the size of government (column 2) or takings and discriminatory taxation (column 3). However, it has had a strong influence on labor market freedom: more market-oriented and rightwing provincial governments have been more active in promoting labor market freedom (column 4), an effect that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The effect is also economically significant as the numerical meaning is that a corresponding increase of the ideology variable by one point -say from -1/3 (a left-leaning Liberal government) to 2/3 (a standard conservative government) -would increase the growth rate of the labor market freedom indicator by about 1.5%. Table 2 provides the results when the parliament ideology index is used. This provides our test of the competing hypothesis that only the ideological make-up of the entire parliament ought to matter, given that Canadian provincial policy-making is indeed characterized by the brokerage model. As expected, the influence of the control variables does not change compared to the results in Table 1 .
The parliament ideology index (rightwing), nevertheless, lacks statistical significance across all specifications. The results thus indicate that parliament ideology did not influence economic liberalization in the Canadian provinces at all. In other words, we do not find evidence of the type of ideological effects that would be consistent with a perfect brokerage type of politics.
Robustness of the results
We checked the robustness of the results in several ways. First, we discuss an alternative econometric specification using a dynamic estimation procedure as it is important to note that the common fixed-effect estimator is biased when including a lagged dependent variable. The estimators taking into account the resulting bias can be broadly grouped into a class of instrumental estimators and a class of direct bias corrected estimators (see Behr 2003 for a discussion). In accordance with large sample properties of GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) will be biased in an econometric model with N=10, such as in this paper. For this reason, bias corrected estimators are more appropriate. We apply Bruno's (2005a Bruno's ( , 2005b bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data models with small N.
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The regression results reported in Table 3 illustrate that the lagged dependent variable does not turn out to be statistically significant in all specifications. The inferences with respect to the government ideology variables on economic liberalization do not change at all. Market-oriented 9 We use the Blundell-Bond (1998) or 500 as well as when the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator.
governments have been more active in promoting labor market freedom. We will focus on this effect and stress the robustness of this finding. Table 4 shows results illustrating the robustness of the government ideology-induced effect on labor market freedom. To avoid any concerns about potential endogeneity problems of, for example, the trade variable, columns (1) and (2) show parsimonious specifications in which solely the government ideology variable (column 1) and the lagged dependent variable (column 2) are included.
We have included further economic control variables such as trade between the Canadian provinces (trade inside Canada), GDP per capita in period t-1 and the size of government (total government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP). It is important to note that purchasing-power parity data on GDP per capita at the provincial level are only available since 1981, so that we could not employ a five-year average without significantly reducing the sample. Yet GDP per capita in period t-1 does not turn out to be statistically significant and its inclusion does not change the inferences at all. In any event, the government ideology-induced effect on labor market freedom turns out to be robust and negative throughout.
Political decisions to liberalize the economy may well need time to be implemented, and the political color of the government may change during this period. For this reason one may want to include lagged government ideology variables. When a single party has been in power for a fairly long time, however, lagged government ideology is less convincing because this particular party has been in office sufficiently long to implement its ideology-induced policy. In any event, to address potential time-lagged ideology effects on labor market freedom, we have replaced the government ideology variable in period t by its lagged values in the periods t-1, t-2 and t-3. The results show that influence (point estimate and statistical significance) of the lagged government ideology in period t-1 on labor market reform strongly increases. The influence of lagged government ideology in period t-2, however, is weaker than in period t, while the influence of lagged government ideology in period t-3 is similar to the influence of government ideology in period t.
A caveat applying to all panel data models concerns potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. It is, however, not reasonable to expect that government ideology is influenced by changes in labor market freedom in the Canadian Provinces. Good instrumental variables for government ideology are simply not available, consistent with the prevalent view that voters decide based on predominantly non-economic information (e.g., Nannestad and Paldam 1997) . Moreover, instrumenting ideology with the help of lagged government ideology would not be reasonable because ideology is highly persistent.
The reported effects could depend on idiosyncratic circumstances in the individual provinces.
We therefore have tested whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular provinces. We note that the influence of the ideology variable declines when Manitoba is excluded but increases when Saskatchewan is excluded. However, our main findings with respect to labor market freedom remain robust.
Decomposing labor market freedom
While the results above show that political ideology influenced labor market deregulation in the Canadian provinces, they do not inform about which aspects of the labor market were affected. We therefore split the labor market freedom indicator into its three components: the extent of minimum wage legislation, the share government employment in total employment, and union density.
The results in Table 5 show that the political ideology of incumbent governments did not influence minimum wage legislation. Conversely, the results show that the finding pertaining to overall labor market freedom is driven by the other two components. Decomposing the index thus reveals that leftwing provincial governments in general expanded government employment, and that union density also rose under leftwing governments. The coefficients of the government ideology variables on government employment and union density are statistically significant at the 5% level and imply that when the government ideology variable increased by 1 point (say from a center to a strong rightwing government) the growth rate of the government employment share decreased by about 1% and the growth rate of the union density decreased by about 0.6%.
Government employment is clearly susceptible to political changes, and in particular to changes in fiscal policy. The influence of government ideology on union density may seem puzzling. However, unionization may, for example, be higher in the government sector than in the private sector, which would indicate that the unionization result simply followed from ideological increases in government employment. We have therefore tested the statistical interaction between the changes in union density and the changes government employment but do not find any association between changes in union density and changes in government employment. Consequently, decreasing government employment and deunionization are statistically separate. The result that government ideology is significantly associated with changes in union density is thus most likely due to union density reflecting overall ideological changes in society, and not due to a causal effect.
Discussion and conclusions
Whether and to what extent the political ideology of government affects policy-making and institutional choices has been a major question in political economy for decades. In this paper, we revisit the question by exploring ideological differences across the Canadian provinces over a 25-year The empirical evidence on how government ideology influenced labor market deregulation is nevertheless somewhat mixed. Botero et al. (2004) , for example, examine labor market deregulation in 85 countries and find that leftwing governments have been associated with more stringent labor regulations than rightwing governments. Across OECD countries only, government ideology merely influenced reforms of unemployment benefit systems, labor taxes, employment protection legislation and retirement schemes (Duval 2008) . The frequency of EU labor market directives, however, can neither be explained by the partisan composition of the Council, nor by the national level of labor market regulation (see the case study evidence by Vaubel 2008: 462) .
Second, our findings are pertinent since the Canadian political system has been characterized by political brokerage for several decades. Intra-party ideological cohesion in Canada is known to be relatively weak although party loyalty is strong and members of parliament are more likely to vote in line with their party than what is the case in, e.g., the US. The official electoral platforms of parties have also traditionally been vague and non-committal. Most decisions have therefore been negotiated in 'the corridor' between the leaders of parties covering disparate ideological points of view, which a priori would lead one to expect that government ideology should not matter for actual policy-making.
Instead, political deals ought logically to be affected only by the relative bargaining strength of parties represented in parliament. Yet, we find no evidence that any of our measures have been influenced by the average ideological position of parliament but evidence to the contrary, that the ideological position of incumbent governments has been important in a particular policy area.
Our results are consequently not in line with the 'standard' view of how Canadian politics work and also appear to imply that the concerns that Canada may be moving towards a 'one-party-plus' situation are less significant (cf. Scotto, Stephenson and Kornberg 2004) . Given that political ideology actually works despite party bargaining in a brokerage model, our results confirm that parties continue to matter. This is consistent with the increasing clarity of ideological positions in more recent years in which new parties have come to play an active role in some Canadian provinces.
In summary, our study indicates that political ideology can play an important role, even in an apparently non-ideological political system as the Canadian. Yet, they also show that the policy area subject to partisan effects across the provinces does not correspond exactly with what is typically found in cross-country studies. The overall results therefore question whether one should expect similar effects across democratic countries. We thus conclude by calling for more research in the way that different institutional and political systems affect the importance of political ideology for policy-making as well as in which areas ideology comes to be important. Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
